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NOTES
IS THE POWER OF THE COURTS TO CONTROL THE
BAR EXCLUSIVE,?
Recent events1 have directed the attention of lawyers as
well as the public to the inherent power of the courts to control
and regulate matters pertaining to the legal profession. A sub-
stantial line of decisions dealing with the question leaves little
doubt that the judiciary can and will guard its power to define
the practice of law, to decide what is unauthorized practice. to
disbar members of the profession and to govern the admission
to practice. The theory on which such power rests is that the
judicial power is inherent, 2 however, the trend in the cases
seems to point to its being exclusive as well. It is the purpose
of this note to examine directly this idea that the inherent power
of the courts to prescribe rules and regulations for the practice
of law is an exclusively judicial power. As will be seen below the
problem can arise in a number of ways, but we are concerned
primarily with situations where the legislature, as well as the
courts, attempts to control directly the matter in question.
The majority of cases brought before the courts concerning
the questions of disbarment and admissions can be handled easily
by the courts on the basis of their inherent power onl The
question as to a court's right to disbar, for example, often is
raised in a case where the legislature has prescribed by statute
certain grounds for disbarment, and other grounds are stated
as the reason for the particular petition for disbarment. The
'Hobson v Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W 2d 454
(1946) Ky H. B. 334 (1948) which provided that graduates of the
University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville law schools
and of other schools which met the standards of these two schools
and were approved by the Court of Appeals should be admitted to
the practice of law in Kentucky without a bar examination; and
the opinion of the Kentucky Attorney General to the effect that the
preparation of income tax returns by anyone other than a licensed
attorney for a fee is the illegal practice of law. KY. Op. ATT. GEN.
24858, 25082, 25284 (1948)
In this connection, see Note, 37 Ky. L. J. 58 (1948)
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same may be true in the case of admissions where the legislature
has specified certain qualifications, and the courts have added
other qualifications to those specified. In Commonwealth v Roe,3
for instance, respondent contended that since the statute had
prescribed causes for which an attorney could be disbarred the
court could not disbar him for any cause not stated in the stat-
ute. The Kentucky Court held that courts, independent of stat-
ute, had the inherent right to disbar an attorney guilty of such
personal or professional conduct as proves him unworthv to have
his name on the rolls. As pointed out in Louisville Bar Assocta-
ton ex rel. Drane v Yonts, 4 the court bases its right to control
and regulate attorneys traditionally on the fact that attorneys
are "officers of the court," and are subject to the court s right.
to puish them for acts of professional misconduct. In Common-
wealth ex rel. Ward v Harrington,5 the Court of Appeals held
that it has original jurisdiction over an inquiry into charges
against an attorney notwithstanding the constitutional provision
coiiferring appellate jurisdiction only, since the inquirv did not
involve judicial power and authority as contemplated in, the
Constitution. In the same year the constitutionality of the Bar
Integration Act,0 which authorized an originaf proceeding in the
Court of Appeals to discipline or disbar an attorney, was chal-
lenged. The court held that the statute gave the court no power
which it did not already possess, since courts had inherent power
to deal with matters relating to attorneys, and found the Act
constitutional.7 In tis case, the court did say, in effect. that in
setting up the machinery called for in the Bar Integration Act,
it was acting out of comity and deference to the legislature, and
was merely exercising an inherent power.8 In fact, this would
seem to be the nearest that the Kentucky Court has come to
declaring that its power of control over affairs of the Bar is
exclusive. In other jurisdictions the situation is similar to that
in Kentucl, in that the courts in general state that while the
legislature may prescribe minimum standards for admission and
"129 Ky. 650, 112 S.W 683 (1908).
'270 Ky. 503, 109 S.W 2d 1186 (1937)
"266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W 2d 53 (1936).
-Ky. R. S. (1946) 30.170.
In re Sparks, 267 Ky 93, 101 S.W 2d 194 (1936)
Id. at 97, 101 S.W 2d at 196.
L.J.-a
KENTUCKY LAv JOURNAI
grounds for disbarment, the judiciary has the power to make
additional requirements and grounds 0
In virtually all of these cases, both in Kentuck and other
juribdietions, the power of the courts to control matters of the
bar has been upheld merely by the court's invoking its inherent
power. without any serious question arising as to the extent of
the legislature's right to exercise a statutory control over the
matter. The question whether the power of the courts over af-
fairs of the bar is exclusive seems to receive appropriate atten-
tion only in those cases in which the legislature attempts to
regulate affirmatively affairs of the profession, and a conflict
between judicial power and legislative power results. For ex-
-ample. suppose that the Court of Appeals follows the opinion of
the Attorney General, mentioned supra,'0 and declares that the
preparation of income tax returns is the practice of law, and that
such preparation by accountants and others is the unauthorized
practice of law Suppose further that the legislature should
pass a statute defining the practice of law and specifically ex-
empt the preparation of income tax returns from the definition.
What decision would the court reach in a proper case testing the
constitutionality of such a statute ? Or, suppose that the legisla-
ture had passed the bill requiring that graduates of certain law
schools in Kentucky be admitted to practice without an exam-
ination. Either situation would put to a clear test the court's
often asserted inherent right to control admissions to the bar
and define the practice of law.
In determining the answer to such a question, one must
have a clear definition of terms. Bouvier's Dictionary defines
"inherent power" as "an authority possessed without its being
derived from another. A right, ability or faculty of doing a
thing. without receiving that right° ability or faculty from
another." "Exclusive" is defined as "not including, debarring
In. re Myeland, 45 Ariz. 484, 45 P 2d 953 (1935), James v.
State, 61 Ga. App. 860, 7 S.E. 2d 398 (1940), Ex parte Steckler, 179
La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934) In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass.
607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932) State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner 141 Neb. 556,
4 N.W 2d 302 (1942) In re Olmstead, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928),
Grievance Committee of State Bar of Texas, 21st Congressional Dis-
trict v Dean, - Tex. Civ. App.- 190 S.W 2d 126 (1945) In re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918), Integration of Bar Case,
244 Wisc. 8, 11 N.W 2d 604 (1943) see In re Williams, -Mo. -App.
- 113 S.W 2d 353, 356 (1938)
"
0Ky. Op ATT. GEN. note I supra.
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from participation. Shut out not included." That the courts
have construed their power in accordance with the dictionary
meaning of "inherent" is obvious from the cases already men-
tioned. Have they at the same time ruled out the possibility of
its being "exclusive" in the sense of "debarring from participa-
tion* by recognizing and enforcing statutes which set up re-
quirements for admission, grounds for disbarment, and which
describe certain acts as the unauthorized practice of law9 Under
the definition above, the answer at first glance would seem to be
in the affirmative. However, the mere fact that courts have en-
forced rules made by the legislature and thus given the legisla-
ture some participation in the regulation of the bar does not of
itself mean that the legislatures have tie power to make valid
rules. Recognizmg an enactment out of comity differs greatly
from enforcing a lawful statute because of the court's duty
The Kentucky Court, while it has not had to decide the
question of exclusiveness directly, has consistently taken a stand
which indicates that it will not be subservient to the legislature
in matters of this kind. It has repeatedly held that it holds its
power independently of statute.' Other jurisdictions which have
had to meet the problem have held generally that the final de
cision on matters concerning the bar is a judicial one. California
denied the right of the legislature to prescribe rules and regula-
tions for adnission to the bar to which courts must conform.i 2
The court stated there that attorneys are part of the judicial
branch, and not subject to the control of the legislature. The
Louisiana court in Ex parte Steekleri 3 held that prescribing
ultinmate qualifications for admission to practice is a judicial
function, and that a statute providing that the holder of a law
degree from Tulane University was authorized to practice law
could not deprive the judiciarv of its right to add to legislative
requirements for admission to the bar. Wisconsin, in State v
Canm ,?, 14 took the position that the legislature cannot compel
the courts to admit to the bar persons deemed by the courts un-
fit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. Georgia
recognizes the right of the legislature to pass laws to asd the
" Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W
2d 53 (1936), lure Sparks, 267 Ky 93, 101 S.W 2d 194 (1936).
12In re Cate, -- Cal.- 273 Pac. 617 (1928)1'-179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
' 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W 441 (1932)
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courts in their regulation of attorneys, but reserves the power to
admit and disbar to the court.15
In connection with the same question, the Mfassachusetts
court held that " control of both admissions to and removal
from the bar of the courts of the Commonwealth is excltswely
in the judicial department of government, and interference
therewith by the legislative department would conflict with
constitutional provisions prohibiting the exercise of executive
and judicial powers by the legislative department.' u' In the
same case, the court said that the requirements enacted by the
legislature were restrictions on the individual and not on the
courts.
Both the Nebraska and Oklahoma courts have decided eases
dealing directly with statutes providing that the graduates of
certain law schools should have certain privileges and be deemed
to have certain qualifications with regard to admission to the
bar. The Nebraska statute17 declared that graduates of all resi-
dent law schools operating within the state should be eligible to
take the state bar examination without reservation. In deciding
that the statute was unconstitutional, the court said that it
it constitutes an endeavor on the part of the Legislature to
go beyond the concept of minimum requirements of an applicant
to take an examination for admission to the bar, and to dictate
to the supreme court that the judicial department shall be
shorn of its power to place higher standards or requirements of
applicants for admission to the bar than the legislature has pro-
vided. " s The Oklahoma statute19 provided that any graduate
of any "Grade A" law school should be admitted to the practice
of law in Oklahoma without examination, upon motion. The
court, in the case of In re Bledsoe,2 0 held that the statute con-
stituted an invasion of the court's inherent power to deternne
the ultimate requirements for admission to the bar and therefore
was unconstitutional. It becomes increasingly apparent that most
courts consider that control of the bar is, in the final analysis, a
"James v. State, 61 Ga. App. 860, 7 S.E. 2d 398 (1940).
" In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725
(1932).
TNEB. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1941) Sec. 7-102.
" State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, - 4 N.W 2d 302,
311 (1942).
"OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 5, Sec. 15 (1939)
1186 Okla. 264, 97 P 2d 536 (1940).
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judicial power,21 although the cases already discussed show that
a number of them accept reasonable regulation by the legis-
latures.
Logic and fundamental policy would seem to support this
position of the courts, for in a sense the'people hold the courts
responsible for swift and efficient administration of justice, and
as an aad in that administration, attorneys should be considered
-officers of the court. Then, too, inefficiency of an attorney or a
defalcation or misconduct on his part reflects upon the courts
and upon the entire legal profession, and since a strong and
respected judiciary is a principle of our governmental system,
the courts should have the power to protect themselves by pre-
scribing standards for admission and conduct of attorneys. As a
necessary corrollary to this power to protect itself and its offi-
cers, the court must have the right to decide what shall consti-
tute the practice of law, and who shall be authorized to practice
it. At the same time, however, the legislature, under its duty to
provide for the general welfare, has the same interest as the
court in having well-trained, highly qualified men of good char-
acter as attorneys to guard and protect the legal interests of the
people. Logically, also, it would seem to be within the "police
power" for the legislature to enact statutes -which set up
iununnimr standards for the profession.
Truly this is a place where the distinctions between judicial
and legislative functions are largely a matter of policy Fortun-
atelv there is some precedent for making a choice as to policy
It is found in those cases dealing -with the question of procedural
Teform, which is another area of considerable conflict between
.judicial and legislative power. In the leading case of Burton v
itaye-,2 2 the Kentucky Court of Appeals has said, "Rules of
practice and procedure are, fundamentally, matters -within the
judicial power and subject to the control of the courts in
the admimstration of justice. The courts accept legislative
-co-operatiom in rendering the judiciary more effective. They
deny the right of legislative domnace in matters of this
2' Contra: The North Carolina court considers that its duty con-
sists merely in giving effect to statutory enactments on the subject
of regulation of the bar. In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55
S.E. 635 (1905)
= 274 Ky. 263, 118 S.W 2d 547 (1938).
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kind. 123 In the same opinion the following paragraph is illus-
trative of the attitude of the court
"So long as rules of practice fixed by the Legisla-
ture accord with the proper and effective administra-
tion of justice, they should be, and they are, followed
to the letter Where, however, a situation arises in
which the administration of justice is impaired or gen-
eral rules of practice are unworkable, the duty un-
doubtedly rests on the courts to draw on the reserve





A number of writers have urged the supremacy of the judi-
ciary in regard to this matter, the most extreme view being pre-
sented by Dean Wigmore, who stated that " all legislatively
declared rules for procedure, civil or criminal, in the courts, are
void, except such as are expressly stated in the Constitution."25
He points out that even if the sentence "Each house may deter-
mine the rules of its proceedings ",26 had not been found in
the Constitution, no one believes that the judiciarv could claim
the right to control legislative rules of procedure, and therefore,
the legislature should not be permitted to do that to the judici-
ary However, many questions of judicial procedure have a di-
rect bearing on the rights of the citizenry and for this reason are
largely political and should be decided by the legislature. Prac-
tically speaking, not all governmental functions can be com-
pletely divided between the departments. There are a number of
powers which fall within the functions of both the judiciary and
the legislature. The regulation of procedural matters is illustra-
tive of such a power. It has been suggested that the field of pro-
cedure must remain divided between these two bodies.2 7 It will
be readily seen that public policy would dictate that the legisla-
ture should control that part of the field having to do with the
political rights of the people while the courts themselves should
control such matters of procedure as form of pleadings, the
methods of securing obedience to its orders, and other matters
Id. at 267, 118 S.W 2d at 549.2- Ibid.
2Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are
Void Constitutionally, 23-ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928)
" U. S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 5.
'Warner, Role of Courts and Judicial Councils in Procedural
Reform, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 441 (1937) and see Shanefeld, The
Scope of Judicial Independence of the Legislature in Matters of
Procedure and Control of the Bar 19 ST. Louis L. REV. 163 (1934).
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having to do generally with the court's routine. Reasonable en-
actments should be followed by the courts, but the legislative
code of procedure should not be permitted by the courts to
hamper them in the administration of justice. The same argu-
ments would seem to apply equally to the problem of legislative
control over the bar.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the inherent power of the
courts to regulate the admission to practice and disbarment, to
define the practice of law, and to decide what is the unauthor-
ized practice of law is not necessarily exclusive, since the legis-
lature has the right, under the police power, to enact minimum
requirements and standards, but that the power of the courts in
this respect, like their power as to rules of procedure, is
superwr to that of the legislature where there is a conflict, since
statutory enactments on the subject are in no way restrictions
on the power of the judiciary
J JERALD JOHNSTOX
